We present and experimentally test a theoretical model of majority threshold determination as a function of voters' risk preferences. The experimental results con…rm the theoretical prediction of a positive correlation between a voter's risk aversion and the corresponding preferred majority threshold. Furthermore, the experimental results show that a voter's optimal majority threshold negatively relates to the voter's con…dence about how others will vote. Moreover, in a treatment in which individuals receive a private signal about others'voting behavior, the private signal tends to replace con…dence.
Introduction
Voting determines a large number of collective decisions. As a major expression of a system's democracy, the design of voting institutions should account, among other things, for citizens' preferences regarding the threshold required in order to determine the winning majority. We argue that people's preferences for a given majority threshold depend on their attitudes towards risk. In this paper, we experimentally test a theoretical framework aimed at modelling individual risk attitudes as a factor that should be taken into account in the design of voting institutions, and especially in the determination of majority thresholds.
An agent knows that future common decisions will be made by voting. Those decisions may be favorable or unfavorable to her, but she does not know how others will vote. Voting becomes a lottery: there is a chance that a favorable majority will form, but also a risk to be tyrannized by an unfavorable majority. The expected value of this lottery crucially depends on the voting rules: for example, less decisive voting rules, such as a high super-majority, reduce the tyranny risk but also the chance to get a favorable outcome. Intuitively, a risk averse agent is more sensitive to the prospect of falling into a minority than to the chance of ending up into a majority. We expect preference for higher super-majorities and less decisive rules from more risk averse agents, and vice versa.
Simple majority is less frequent in the real world, than it may appear. Most countries have de facto super-majority requirements because of bicameral legislatures: it is not easy to undo the status-quo if a bill has to pass a two-house majority. Legislation processes are often subject to executive vetoes or other forms of check and balances. International agreements usually require unanimity (WTO), veto power (the UN Security Council), or high super-majorities (the Council of the EU). When corporate boards vote on major actions (mergers and acquisitions, major capital expansions, etc.), high super-majorities are generally required. We claim that this extensive use of super-majorities de facto re ‡ects a general aversion towards the risk of being tyrannized. In many cases, the trade-o¤ between protection and decisiveness is solved in favor of protection.
We add a further dimension to our analysis: the agent's priors about how others will vote. The simple intuition is that when an agent thinks of herself as substantially di¤erent from the others, then she thinks that the others are less likely to vote like her; thus she assigns a higher probability to the event of being tyrannized. Given her risk attitudes, she demands for stronger protection: i.e., for a higher threshold. With this dimension, we explore how preferences for voting rules depend either on exogenous psychological attitudes, such as subjective con…dence, or on the "rational" use of information about the policy preferences of other people.
Reality shows that those who think of themselves as di¤erent from the majority ask for more protectionist rules. This is the case of ethnic minorities, that are usually protected by constitutional provisions that cannot be undone by the majority. In the EU, members may always invoke a conditional veto power when decisions concern their crucial interests (the so-called Luxemburg compromise).
We support theoretical predictions with experimental data. We …nd a positive and signi…cant correlation between the majority threshold chosen by an agent and her degree of risk aversion as measured by standard experimental techniques. Moreover, agent's preferred majority threshold is negatively and signi…cantly correlated with her subjective over-con…dence. However, when agents can observe a private signal on the distribution of voters'preferences over the policies to vote, we …nd that preferred majority thresholds are fully determined by the signal, rather than their naive priors.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we relate our paper to the existing literature on public choice. In section 3 we describe our experimental design. Section 4 draws the main theoretical predictions to test. In section 5, we present experimental results and section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
In order to focus on risk attitudes, voting is presented as a lottery where uncertainty derives from ignorance about how others will vote. Thus the outcome risk can be controlled by setting up an appropriate majority threshold.
The idea that the preferences for voting rules re ‡ect the uncertainty about the voting outcome and risk aversion is not new in the literature. Rae (1969) focuses on the uncertainty related to gains or losses generated from the making of a law. He suggests that the bare majority is the only rule that minimizes the expected cost of being part of the minority. This result is formally proved in Taylor (1969) . In fact, Rae's result applies to voting contests in which costs and gains are equal and also equally likely to arise from a bill that is opposed to the status quo. Attanasi, Corazzini and Passarelli (2009) extend Rae's (1969) setting to a wider range of situations. The most preferred voting rule optimizes the trade-o¤ between the risk of ending up into an unfavorable minority and the chance to be part of the majority. Of course, risk aversion implies stronger preference for more conservative rules. This tendency to protect from the risk of bad policy decisions is the same reason why in Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004) a representative agent prefers a lower degree of insulation of political leaders. The authors do not speci…cally consider quali…ed majorities, but it is easy to see that an Executive is less insulated when a higher super-majority is required to pass laws in the Parliament. The optimal degree of insulation depends on the cost of compensating the losers, uncertainty about gains and losses, the degree of risk aversion. In Aghion and Bolton (2002) risk derives from ex-ante ignorance about losses or gains from the provision of a public good. In this scenario, if the expected cost of compensating the losing minority raises, then agents prefer a higher quali…ed majority threshold.
We claim here that an individual who is more optimistic about how the others will vote perceives a lower risk of tyranny. As a consequence, she prefers more decisive voting rules. This relationship between con…dence and preferences for voting rules is new in the literature. So far con…dence has been directly related to voting preferences rather than to the preferences for voting rules. Seminal papers are Faith (1980,1981) and Zorn and Martin (1986) .
In our experimental setting, uncertainty originates from the random assignment of subjects' favorite alternatives. To the best of our knowledge, there are no experimental works analyzing the choice of majority thresholds at the individual level and relating them to risk aversion and con…dence. The experimental literature has paid much more attention to strategic voting, as a situation that arises due to the tension between an individual voter's true preferences and the expected e¤ect of a vote on the …nal outcome. Speci…cally, the studies by Fiorina and Plott (1978) and Plott (1991) report experimental results supporting the notion of the core. On the contrary, voting through truthful revelation of voters'preferences has received little, if any, attention because of researchers'lack of interest in the apparently trivial situation in which a voter simply translates her preference into an actual vote. However, our paper shows that truthful voting may still be a fruitful area of research, in the framework of which we can study voters' preferences over di¤erent voting institutions. A number of experimental studies have paid attention to the role of majority rules (Fiorina and Plott (1978) ) and other alternatives like Borda rule, approval voting (Forsythe et al. (1996) ) and unanimity (Guarnaschelli, McKelvey and Palfrey (2000) ) on the observed outcomes. Recently, some experiments have been conducted, such as Hortala-Vallve (2004) and Casella et al. (2006 Casella et al. ( , 2008 , which explore the behavior of laboratory committees using novel voting methods that allow members to express strength of preference. However, in all these papers the majority rule is exogenously imposed by the experimenter while the focus of the studies is on the voting outcomes obtained. Therefore, the emergence of di¤erent voting institutions as the result of agents'preferences over them remains unexplored. Furthermore, as we argue in this paper, it is anything but trivial to investigate some of the sources of a voter's preference for a particular majority threshold. Rather than exogenously imposing the threshold as an invariant political institution, we consider voters with di¤erent idiosyncratic features which may give rise to di¤erent preferences for a higher or a lower majority threshold in a given voting process.
Following the insights of our theoretical model, we relate the subject's preferred majority threshold to her subjective degree of risk aversion. We also relate the majority threshold chosen by the subject to her belief about the distribution of votes exogenously assigned to the other voters. Therefore, the kind of "con…dence" we are interested in is the one that an agent shows when being asked to evaluate the probability of a random policy outcome, that can get her a gain, a loss, or the status quo. Empirical studies in behavioral …nance do not …nd clear-cut evidence that overcon…dent investors actually do take more risks (see e.g. Dorn and Huberman (2005) and Menkho¤ et al. (2006) ). Interestingly, experimental literature has shown that individuals seem to be both overly optimistic about future outcomes and prone to overcon…dence (see e.g. Lichtenstein et al. (1982) ) and that these biases can lead to distortions in risk taking behavior. In our experiment, we elicit a subject's con…dence (uncon…dence) in two di¤erent situations. In one treatment, subjects are asked to state their beliefs about the exogenous distribution of votes over two alternatives. In this treatment they only know that the probability for each subject's vote to be assigned to either one or the other of the two alternatives is the same. In another treatment, we ask the subjects the same question, after having let them observe a private signal about the votes distribution. Thus, we can estimate the e¤ects of exit polls and pre-voting information on both subjects' beliefs and their preferred threshold. Existing literature has shown that exit polls and pre-voting information a¤ect voting behavior (see e.g. Blais and Bodet (2006) , McAllister and Studlar (1991), Sudman (1986) ). We check whether and, if so, in which way, pre-voting information a¤ects the preferred threshold.
The Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of two treatments, the NO-INFO and the INFO treatment. In the NO-INFO treatment, subjects participated to two consecutive phases. 1 Only one of the two phases was used to determine subjects' …nal payo¤. In particular, at the end of the session, we randomly selected the phase to pay by ‡ipping a coin. Instructions were distributed and read aloud at the beginning of each phase. In the …rst phase, subjects participated to a variant of the Holt and Laury's mechanism to elicit agents'risk aversion (Holt and Laury, 2002) . Subjects were presented with a battery of 19 pairs of lotteries numbered from (line) L1 to (line) L19 and a last (empty) line L20. Each pair described two lotteries called A and B. Each lottery presented two possible monetary outcomes, a favorable and an unfavorable outcome, as well as their attached probabilities. Probabilities were framed by means of an urn that contained twenty tickets, numbered from 1 to 20. The structure of the battery had two main characteristics. First, within each pair, lottery A and lottery B had the same probability structure but di¤erent monetary outcomes. In particular, the favorable and the unfavorable outcome of lottery A were 12:00 and 10:00 euros respectively, while they were set to 22:00 and 0:50 euros for lottery B. Second, across pairs, while we kept constant the monetary outcomes of the corresponding lotteries, we varied the probabilities of the favorable and unfavorable outcomes. In particular, while in L1 the probabilities of the favorable and unfavorable outcome where 1=20 and 19=20 respectively, they were gradually and monotonically changed across pairs in such a way that in L19 they ended up with 19=20 and 1=20 respectively. Given the battery, each subject was asked to choose the line (pair of lotteries) starting from which she preferred lottery B to lottery A. Thus, for all the pairs of lotteries above her choice, a subject preferred lottery A to lottery B, while starting from the pair on the chosen line and for all the pairs below, she preferred lottery B to lottery A. A subject preferring lottery A to lottery B for all the 19 pairs selected the last (empty) line L20. Participants knew that, if the …rst phase of the experiment was selected to determine their …nal earnings, the computer would randomly select a pair of lotteries for each participant. Given her choice and according to the pair selected by the computer, each subject participated to the preferred lottery. Then, an experimenter randomly drew one of the twenty tickets contained in the urn. The ticket drawn by the experimenter was used to determine the outcome of the preferred lottery and the corresponding payo¤.
We will use subject's choice in the …rst phase of the experiment as a proxy of her degree of risk aversion. Given the structure of the battery, the higher the number of the line chosen by the subject, the higher her degree of risk aversion. Note that, di¤erently from the original setting proposed by Holt and Laury (2002) , in our experiment we imposed consistency. Indeed, rather than o¤ering further evidence on (in-)consistency of risk preferences, in this paper we are interested in measuring the correlation between risk aversion and the preferred majority threshold. 2 The second phase of the experiment consisted of two consecutive parts. Again, the instructions of each decisional task were distributed and read aloud at the beginning of each part. In the …rst part of the second phase, each subject was asked to choose a majority threshold included between the simple majority and the unanimity, that she wanted to apply in a voting procedure between two alternatives, X and Y . At the beginning of the phase, the computer randomly assigned to each subject and with equal probability one of two types, x or y. Given her type, the vote of each subject was automatically assigned by the computer to the corresponding alternative, such that x type voters supported alternative X while y type voters supported alternative Y . Subjects were informed that, in case at the end of the experiment the second phase was selected to be paid, the payo¤ of each subject from the …rst part was determined by comparing her preferred majority threshold with the distribution of x type voters and y type voters in that session. In particular, if the majority threshold stated by a subject was equal to or smaller than the number of subjects of her own type, then she earned 22:00 euros; while, if it was equal to or smaller than the number of subjects of the other type, she earned nothing. Finally, if neither the number of subjects of her own type nor that of the other type were greater than or equal to her stated majority threshold, then the subject earned 11:00 euros. In the second part of the second phase, each subject was asked to guess the distribution of x type and y type voters in that session. If the second phase was selected to be paid and her guess was correct, then 3:00 euros were added to the subject's earnings from the …rst part of this phase.
The only di¤erence between the NO-INFO and the INFO treatment was that in the latter, at the beginning of the second phase, each subject privately observed a signal about the distribution of x type and y type voters in that session. In particular, for each subject the computer randomly selected a subset of seven participants. Then, each subject was presented with the distribution of x type and y type voters in the correspondent subset. After that, each subject was asked to choose a majority threshold (part 1) and to guess the distribution of x type and y type voters in that session (part 2), as in the NO-INFO treatment.
Theory
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model in which the majority threshold preferred by an agent depends on her degree of risk aversion and her priors about how others will vote.
In political choices, the agent faces a certain amount of risk if she does not know how others will vote. Consider agent j. Her voting prospect can be represented as a non degenerated lottery in the following way. Let N = f1; :::; n; jg be the set of n + 1 agents who play a majority voting game where q is the majority threshold and agents have one vote each. Thus the sum of votes is n + 1. Assume that the threshold must be at least the simple majority.
Let u j (:) be j's utility function. The argument of u j is a policy outcome. Assume that two alternative policy reforms, W and L, are opposed one to another within a legislature. Either reform passes only if it reaches the required majority threshold. 3 From j's perspective, W is better than the status quo, and L is worse:
We say that j "wins" if her most preferred policy alternative, W , reaches the required majority in voting. Agent j "loses" when this happens for the least preferred alternative, L. The status quo S remains if no alternative reaches the required majority threshold. In other words, agent j wins only if, in addition to her, a coalition T W that commands at least q 1 votes forms. She loses if an adverse coalition T L of voters that favor L collects at least q votes. We are interested in the probability that either T W , or T L or no winning coalition form, and in how these chances depend on the majority threshold.
Let us assume that agent j thinks that any other agent i (where i = 1; ::; n) will cast her vote in favor of W with subjective probability p, and will vote for L with probability (1 p). 4 One may say that p captures j's degree of con…dence regarding how the other n agents will vote. Thus, the others'votes behave as n independent random variables, Z, where Z = 1 with probability p, and Z = 0 with probability (1 p). As a consequence, the probability of forming T W is given by the probability that the sum of those variables is at least q 1. If we assume that the number of agents is su¢ ciently large so that the Central Limit Theorem applies, the sum of votes gotten by T W is distributed like a normal with parameters W = n p and 2 W = np(1 p). 5 Let f W (:) be its density function, and call Pr fW g the probability of winning (i.e. the probability of T W forming); thus,
Conversely, j's subjective probability of falling into the minority (the probability that T L forms) is
where f L (:) is a normal density function with parameters: L = n (1 p), and
An illustration of possible f W (:) and f L (:) is given in …gure 1 below. Finally, j's subjective probability that the status quo prevails (the probability that neither T W nor T L reach the required majority) is
Thus, from agent j's viewpoint, voting can be described as a lottery with three possible outcomes and attached subjective probabilities, as de…ned in (1-3) ; i.e. as = (W; Pr fW g ; L; Pr fLg ; S; Pr fSg) :
Observe that all probabilities in depend, among other things, on the majority threshold, q. For example, with the simple majority, Pr fSg is close to zero, whereas with unanimity, the status quo is "almost"certain. Thus, agent j's expected utility from the voting lottery
depends on the majority threshold q. Call q the threshold that maximizes EU j . Below, we show that q is positively related to j's degree of risk aversion, and negatively related to her degree of con…dence. The …rst-order condition (FOC) on (4) for a stationary point q 0 is
From (5) it is clear that the agent balances the marginal impact of q on the expected bene…t of belonging to the majority with the marginal impact of q on the expected loss of falling into the minority. Solving (5) yields the unique stationary point:
where
Call R j in (7) the ratio between agent j's bene…ts of not being tyrannized by an undesired majority, u j (S) u j (L), and her bene…ts of being part of a favorable winning majority, u j (W ) u j (S). Basically, R j is positively related to j's risk aversion. The idea is that, for given policy outcomes, W , L and S, a more risk averse agent "weights"the advantage of avoiding the tyranny of an adverse majority (the numerator) more than the advantage of being part of a favorable majority (the denominator). We will come back to this point below.
From the second-order condition (SOC) of EU j maximization, it follows that q 0 is a maximum if:
Observe that (8) implies that, for any q, a favorable majority is always more likely than an unfavorable one; i.e. Pr fW g > Pr fLg. In this situation, therefore, if the majority threshold is too high, lowering it may be advantageous because the expected utility of winning increases more than the expected disutility of losing. If the threshold is too low, raising it may be advantageous for the opposite reason. Let us consider now what happens in the case (8) is satis…ed. Then we will look at the case in which it is not.
Case 1: (8) holds
Notice that (8) holds if and only if p > 0:5 , with ! 0 + , given that we assume that the number of agents is su¢ ciently large. Therefore, agent j is "con…dent"that the probability of a favorable majority is always higher than an unfavorable one. It is easy to see that in this case the maximum q 0 is larger than 1 2 if R j > 1. This means that the agent prefers either a super-majority or unanimity, i.e. q 2 1 2 ; 1 , if the gains of winning (u j (W ) u j (S)) are lower than the gains from not losing (u j (S) u j (L)). The intuition is clear: if j has little advantages in winning, compared to the disadvantage of losing, she tends to protect herself with a super-majority. To some extent, the positive prospect that winning is more likely than losing is mitigated by the higher cost of falling into a minority. She somehow fears to be tyrannized, then she prefers a super-majority. If R j 1, the agent has two good perspectives from voting: on the one hand, winning is always more likely; on the other hand, losing is (weakly) less costly than winning. In this case, she wants to increase the chance of winning by choosing a low threshold, even though this will also increase the chance of losing. Therefore, q , and the preferred threshold q is constrained to be the bare majority.
Case 2: (8) does not hold Notice that (8) does not hold if and only if p < 0:5 , with ! 0 + , given that we assume that the number of agents is su¢ ciently large. Therefore, agent j is "uncon…dent", in the sense speci…ed above. In this case, q 0 is the minimum of EU j . Thus, the preferred threshold q is either unanimity or the simple majority. It is however possible to say something else about the preferred threshold. Observe that if R j 1, q 0 in (6) is lower than 1 2 ; in other words, EU j reaches a minimum below the simple majority. In this case, the preferred threshold q is unanimity. The intuition is clear: since (8) does not hold, winning is always less likely than losing; moreover, R j 1 implies that losing is relatively more costly than winning. The voting lottery presents a double disadvantage: tyranny is highly likely and highly costly. This is the worst situation; thus, not surprisingly, the agent prefers the highest protection from the risk of being tyrannized. This kind of protection is provided by unanimity. If R j < 1, winning is relatively more attractive than losing. In this case, the agent might prefer a simple majority to unanimity, despite winning is always less likely. Intuitively, the simple majority becomes the preferred threshold if the relative advantage of winning (1=R j ) is higher than the relative probability of losing when the simple majority threshold is set up. 6 In other words, if Pr fW g is only slightly lower than Pr fLg, and winning generates high bene…ts compared to the cost of losing, the agent prefers to give up the highest protection of unanimity in favor of the lowest protection given by the bare majority threshold.
So far we have seen that a corner solution (i.e. the bare majority or the unanimity) emerges when (8) is not satis…ed, whereas an internal solution (a super-majority) may emerge if (8) holds. In both cases, however, the agent prefers a low threshold when R j is su¢ ciently low. In other words, if the advantages from winning are su¢ ciently high compared to the cost of losing, the agent asks for low protection from the majority tyranny, because this also implies increasing the chance of winning. Observe that R j is low not only when the favorable outcome is relatively high compared to the unfavorable one, but also when, given gains and losses, u j is rather convex or not highly concave. Thus, for any W , S and L, R j decreases if the agent's risk aversion decreases. 7 . This positive relation between risk aversion and the preferred threshold is one of the two theoretical predictions that we test with our experiment.
An additional prediction to be validated concerns the role of the subjective probability p, capturing the agent's degree of con…dence about how the other agents will vote. In this case, the intuition provided by the theoretical model is straightforward. Higher p means that the agent considers winning relatively more likely; thus, other 6 The relative probability of losing is 1 xj xj , where x j is the probability of winning when the simple majority threshold is set up. Given that j is uncon…dent (i.e. she thinks that winning is less likely than loosing), it is 1 xj xj > 1. 7 Note that all lotteries over three …xed prizes can be represented in the 2-dimensional MachinaMarschak triangle. The slope of indi¤erence curves on this domain is exactly R j and, indeed, the more risk averse agent j is, the steeper the indi¤erence curves are (see Machina (1987) for details).
things being equal, she fears losing less and prefers lower protection. In this case, she wants to facilitate majority formation, because, for any q, a favorable majority has become more probable; thus, she wants a lower threshold. 8 Notice that the e¤ect of p on the preferred threshold is independent of the agent's risk aversion. In fact, our model predicts that if a con…dent agent (p > 0:5 ) and an uncon…dent agent (p < 0:5 ) have the same ratio R in (7), the preferred threshold of the former is never higher, i.e. "less risky". 9 We test the negative e¤ect of agents'con…dence on the preferred majority thresholds in two di¤erent settings. In the …rst treatment, we measure con…dence by simply asking uninformed agents to state their genuine priors about the distribution of others'votes over the two alternatives. In the second treatment, we study how the e¤ects of con…dence change when agents, before stating their preferred majority thresholds, privately observe a signal about the (exogenous) distribution of votes over policies.
Experimental Results
Overall, we run three sessions of the NO-INFO treatment and two sessions of the INFO treatment. Each session of the NO-INFO treatment involved 31 subjects, while each session of the INFO treatment involved 35 subjects. Each subject could only participate in one of these sessions. The sessions were run at the EELAB, University of Milan -Bicocca, in 2008 and at the Bocconi University, Milan, in 2009. Each session lasted around one hour and subjects earned on average 12.59 euros plus 3.00 euros of show-up fee. The experiment was computerized using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007 ). Table 1 reports the distribution of subjects'choices in the …rst phase of the experiment. More than 78% of subjects choose a pair of lotteries included between the 11th and the 20th line, with the median choice being the 16th. Thus, as in other experiments, 10 we observe the majority of subjects exhibiting risk aversion. 8 Let us sketch the proof of this intuition: if p increses, q 0 in (6) decreases if it is a maximum, and it increases if it is a minimum; in both cases, the agents prefers a (weakly) lower threshold. 9 For example, if R ! 0 + , both agents choose the simple majority. If R ! 1 , the con…dent agent chooses the simple majority, while the uncon…dent chooses unanimity. The same happens if R = 1. Finally, if R 2 (1; +1), then the con…dent agent chooses either a quali…ed majority or unanimity, while the uncon…dent chooses unanimity. 10 Moving to the second phase of the experiment, we start from analyzing subjects' guesses about the distribution between x type and y type voters. Given that, for each subject, both types have the same probability and the random draws are independent for all subjects, a "rational" subject should always show "moderate" con…dence, i.e. 1 + W L = 1: In other words, a "rational"subject should always expect the rest of the population being equally splitted over the two alternatives. Thus, knowing her type, she should always expect probability of winning being moderately higher than probability of loosing. We de…ne "over"-con…dent a subject who states a distribution of the other subjects'votes that is biased in favour of her type, i.e. 1 + W L > 1. Therefore, according to their guess in the second phase of the experiment, we split the subjects into two subsets: con…dent and uncon…dent ones. The subset of con…dent subjects is composed by those being moderately con…-dent (and so "rational") and those being over-con…dent, according to the de…nitions above. A "rational" subject expects that n=2 + 1 subjects in her session (including herself) will be of her type. Therefore, we built for each subject a measure of con…dence de…ned as the di¤erence between the number of voters she expects to have her own type and n=2 + 1. The distribution of this measure of con…dence is shown in …gure 1.
The NO-INFO treatment
Observe that the modal guess is "rational" (n=2 + 1), whereas around 58% of subjects exhibit over-con…dence. A binomial test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of equal distribution between con…dent and uncon…dent subjects either by considering or excluding the "rational" ones (p-value < 0:01). According to a Spearman correlation test, we …nd no signi…cant correlation between risk aversion (as proxied by the subject's choice in the …rst phase) and her con…dence. This holds both by considering the measure of con…dence introduced above (rho = 0:082, p-value = 0:432) and by using a dummy variable that assumes value one if the subject is con…dent (rho = 0:027, p-value = 0:792; considering only the over-con…dent ones, rho = 0:090, p-value = 0:389).
Result 1. The majority of subjects exhibit risk aversion and report over-con…dent guesses. There is not signi…cant correlation between the degree of risk aversion and con…dence.
Let us now look at the preferred majority thresholds. Table 2 reports the distribution of subjects'choices about thresholds in the second phase of the experiment. The median preferred threshold is 24 (in percentage, around 77%), while the modal threshold is unanimity. The …rst column of table 3 reports results from a Tobit model in which the chosen majority thresholds are regressed on individual degrees of risk aversion and two dummies, one for rationality and the other for over-con…dence. The majority thresholds are positively and highly correlated with subjects'degree of risk aversion (the estimated coe¢ cient of Risk Aversion is 0:499 and it is signi…cant at the 1% level). This result is con…rmed by non-parametric tests. Indeed, according to a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, the majority thresholds chosen by subjects exhibiting risk aversion are signi…cantly higher than those chosen by risk lovers (p-value = 0:012). As for the con…dence, the coe¢ cients of both dummies are negative and only the one re ‡ecting over-con…dence is highly signi…cant. Notes. This table reports coe¢ cient estimates (robust standard errors in parentheses) from Tobit models for both the NO-INFO and INFO treatment. The dependent variable is given by the majority thresholds chosen by subjects in the …rst part of the second phase of the experiment. Risk Aversion is given by subjects'choices in the …rst part of the experiment. Rationality and Over-Con…dence are dummies assuming value one if, in the second part of the second phase of the experiment, a subject reported "rational" or over-optimistic guesses respectively. For a given signal received by a subject in the second phase of the INFO treatment, Net Favorable Signal is the difference between the number of voters of her own type and the number of voters of the other type in her observed subset of seven subjects. *, ** and *** denote statistical signi…cance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
Thus, after controlling for the degree of risk aversion, over-con…dent subjects choose majority thresholds that are signi…cantly lower than the thresholds chosen by the uncon…dent ones. This evidence and the non signi…cant correlation between con…dence and risk aversion discussed above support the theoretical insights of our model. In fact, the theoretical model predicts that a con…dent subject with a given degree of risk aversion will never choose a higher threshold than an uncon…dent one with same degree of risk aversion. This is due to the assumption that risk aversion and con…dence are independent idiosyncratic features in our model.
Result 2.
Subjects prefer super-majority thresholds. Subjects' preferences strongly depend on behavioral characteristics. In particular, majority thresholds are positively correlated with risk aversion and negatively correlated with con…dence. Table 4 shows the distribution of subjects'choices in the …rst phase of the experiment. Similarly to the NO-INFO treatment, the median choice in the …rst phase of the experiment is line 16. More than 84% of subjects exhibit risk aversion. We do not …nd any signi…cant di¤erence between treatments in the risk parameter (WilcoxonMann-Whitney test, p-value = 0:607).
The INFO treatment
Consider now the second phase of the experiment. Recall that, in the INFO treatment, before choosing the majority threshold and stating her guess, each subject observed the distribution of x type and y type voters in a subset of seven subjects. In order to classify subjects as con…dent or uncon…dent, we must combine subjects' stated guesses with the informative content of their private signal. First, for each subject, we built a theoretical distribution by rescaling the number of xs and ys in the private signal to the size of the subject pool. Then, we built for each subject a new measure of con…dence de…ned as the di¤erence between the number of voters she expects to have her own type and the predicted number obtained by rescaling the private signal she received. Figure 2 reports the distribution of this new measure of con…dence.
As shown by the graph, 36% of subjects reported "rational" guesses, while 41% exhibited over-con…dence. We built a dummy assuming value one if the subject is "rational", a dummy assuming value one if the subject exhibits over-con…dence and a dummy assuming value one in case of uncon…dence. Recall that in this treatment a "rational"subject should rescale the distribution of the signal she privately received to the size of the subject pool. Accordingly, over-con…dence means that the subject's guess on the number of voters of her own type is strictly larger than the predicted number inferred by rescaling the signal. As shown in table 5, although the population is equally splitted between those observing a favorable signal and those receiving an unfavorable one, a binomial test rejects the null hypothesis of an equal distribution between con…dent and uncon…dent subjects. This is true both by including (p-value = 0:000) and by excluding (p-value = 0:072) the "rational" subjects amongst the con…dent ones. Table 5 .
Note. This table reports the distribution of Over-Con…dent, "Rational"and Uncon…-dent subjects in INFO cross-tabulated with the information contained in their signals.
The table also reports results from a binomial test for the null hypothesis of an equal distribution between Con…dent and Uncon…dent subjects either by including (a) or by excluding (b) from the …rst category those reporting "rational" guesses.
By considering only subjects observing an unfavorable signal, there is a clear tendency towards over-con…dence (20 subjects out of 35 report over-con…dent guesses, while only 3 show uncon…dence), con…rming the tendency in the NO-INFO treatment. Interestingly, a di¤erent picture emerges when we focus on those observing a favorable signal. In this case, the proportion of over-con…dent subjects is slightly smaller than the uncon…dent ones (9 vs 13). However, the proportion of subjects being "rational"is almost the same that we …nd when the signal is unfavorable. We have an intuitive interpretation for this evidence. Suppose that, when asked to state her prior without observing any signal, a subject is genuinely over-con…dent (i.e. over-con…dent according to the measure de…ned for NO-INFO). If we let this subject observe a favorable private signal, then she "tempers"her over-con…dence and shows herself as "rational" (according to the measure de…ned for INFO). If instead she observes an unfavorable signal, her genuine over-con…dence prevails. Although the opposite happens for genuinely uncon…dent subjects, this e¤ect is less evident, given the relative small number of these subjects.
Similarly to the NO-INFO treatment, risk aversion is not signi…cantly correlated to con…dence. This is true both if we consider the measure of con…dence introduced for the INFO treatment (rho = 0:122, p-value = 0:315) and by using a dummy variable with value one when a subject exhibits con…dence (rho = 0:093, p-value = 0:442; considering only the over-con…dent ones, it is rho = 0:164, p-value = 0:279).
Result 3. More than one third of subjects react to the private signal by rationally updating their guesses about the others' types. A large proportion of subjects continue to exhibit over-con…dence.
Consider now the …rst part of the second phase of the experiment. Table 6 reports the distribution of subjects'choices about thresholds. The modal choice is unanimity; the second most preferred threshold is the simple majority. In the second column of table 3, we present results from a Tobit model that regresses 20 the majority threshold chosen by a subject on the same set of explanatory variables used for the NO-INFO treatment and on Net Favorable Signal. This variable is de…ned, given the signal that a subject receives, as the di¤erence between the number of voters of her own type and the number of voters of the other type in her observed subset of seven subjects. As before, the estimated coe¢ cient of Risk Aversion is positive and highly signi…cant. Interestingly, neither Over-Con…dence nor Rationality are signi…cant while Net Favorable Signal is highly signi…cant. Thus, the private signal tends to replace (or at least has a stronger impact than) subject's over-con…dence in determining the preferred majority threshold.
Result 4
In the INFO treatment, there is a positive and highly signi…cant correlation between subject's preferred majority threshold and her degree of risk aversion. Moreover, the private signal replaces the in ‡uence of her over-con…dence in determining her preferred majority threshold.
Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that the fear of being subject to a majority tyranny leads an individual to prefer more demanding majority thresholds. In accordance to the theoretical prediction, our experimental results show that the level of the preferred majority threshold depends on the voter's risk aversion and on subjective priors about how others will vote. Therefore, a more risk averse and a less con…dent agent may fear more being tyrannized by an unfavorable majority, thus asking for higher super-majorities. These …ndings have important implications for the design of the optimal voting system, which have been neglected by the literature so far. 11 As a major expression of a system's democracy, the design of voting institutions should account, among other things, for citizens' preferences regarding the threshold required in order to determine the winning majority.
It is also worth observing that, while risk aversion is intrinsically related to an individual's perception of private gains and losses, lack of con…dence re ‡ects an individual's perception about how own preferences may di¤er from the others'. Lack of con…dence may derive from the feeling of being di¤erent in ideology, needs, desires, vision of the world. This is particularly important in collective situations, such as
voting. An uncon…dent individual may think that the majority is di¤erent from herself and consequently she does not want the majority to easily make decisions that will a¤ect her. Thus, over-con…dence is a behavioral distortion that possibly a¤ects the calculus of the threshold. In fact, we …nd that naively over-con…dent individuals signi…cantly prefer lower thresholds. As soon as agents receive a private signal according to which others are more likely to vote in a favorable way, naive over-con…dence is replaced by the signal. Thus, the preferred thresholds are fully determined by the signal, rather than by voters' naive priors. Our …ndings are in line with the existing literature on the role of exit polls and pre-voting information on agents'choice. However, while previous experimental works focus on the role of exit polls on voting behavior, our paper sheds light on their relevance for agents' preferences on the voting rules.
Of course, protection comes at the cost of lower chance to overcome the status quo in a favorable way. One might argue that this individual trade o¤ between risk of tyranny and chance of being part of a favorable majority re ‡ects the trade o¤ at collective level between decisiveness of the voting rules and the need of protecting minorities. In this paper we have not answered the question of which threshold will be chosen at the constitutional level, and whether it is "socially"optimal or not. We think, however, that our …ndings contribute to answer important normative issues such as: how do voting rules re ‡ect the risk attitudes of citizens where crucial policy issues are concerned? What kind of protection do agents demand when they belong to an ethnic minority or when they think that their policy preferences are di¤erent from the bulk of the population? What degree of con ‡ict on decisional rules should we expect within a constituency whose members have diversi…ed preferences? How many super-majority thresholds should a statute include, and for which issues?
Phase 1 Your task in this phase.
Please take a look at Table 1 . Table 1 describes 19 pairs of lotteries, with each pair corresponding to different Line. Each pair consists of two lotteries, called A (left column) and B (right column). For each lottery of a pair, the table indicates the monetary outcomes as well as the attached probabilities expressed in terms of tickets. Notice that, within each pair of lotteries, the number of the tickets assigned to the higher and to the lower monetary outcome is the same. Within each pair, the only difference between lottery A and lottery B is in the monetary earnings: -in lottery A, the higher monetary outcome is 12.00 euros and the lower is 10.00 euros; -in lottery B, the higher monetary outcome is 22.00 euros and the lower is 0.50 euros.
You have to indicate from which pair of lotteries you prefer taking part to lottery B rather than to lottery A. In other words, in your computer screen you have to select a Line number from L1 to L20, such that: -for all the pairs above the line you have chosen, you prefer lottery A to lottery B; -for the line you have chosen and for all the lines below, you prefer lottery B to lottery A. Notice that selecting line L1 means that you prefer lottery B to lottery A for all the 19 pairs, while selecting the last (empty) line L20 means that you prefer lottery A to lottery B for all the 19 pairs.
At the end of the experiment, in case phase 1 will be randomly selected for payment, the earnings will be determined as follows.
First, for each participant, the computer will randomly select a pair of lotteries. Given the pair of lotteries the computer will select for you, your choice will be used to determine which lottery you will participate. At this point, an experimenter will randomly draw one of the 20 tickets. The selected ticket will be the winning ticket and it will be the same for all the participants.
Example
For all the pairs of lotteries from L1 to L6, John prefers lottery A to lottery B, while he prefers lottery B to lottery A for all the pairs from L7 to L19. For this reason, John chooses L7. At the end of the experiment, phase 1 is randomly selected for payment. Suppose that the computer selects the pair L10 for John. Given his choice, for L10 John prefers lottery B to lottery A. At this point, we randomly draw one of the 20 tickets. If the number of the selected ticket is between 1 and 10, John receives 22.00 euros; if the number of the selected ticket is between 11 and 20, John receives 0.50 euros. Phase 2
This phase consists of two parts. The instructions of the second part will be distributed at the end of the first part.
Part 1 of phase 2
Your task in part 1 of phase 2.
In this part of phase 2, you will be involved in the voting over two alternatives, X and Y.
You have to choose the majority threshold required to determine the winning alternative, knowing that:
[NO- INFO Treatment] • there are 31 participants in this session. Each participant counts for one vote only. Thus, the majority threshold you have to choose must be included between 16 votes (the simple majority) and 31 votes (the unanimity).
• the vote of each participant is randomly (with equal probability) and anonymously assigned by the computer to one of the two alternatives. For each participant there is a separate random draw. Before choosing the majority threshold, you will be informed about which alternative you support. However, you will not observe the alternative voted by any of the other participants, which could be X or Y with equal probability.
[INFO Treatment]
• there are 35 participants in this session. Each participant counts for one vote only. Thus, the majority threshold you have to choose must be included between 18 votes (the simple majority) and 35 votes (the unanimity).
• before choosing the majority threshold, each participant will be shown the number of votes in favor of X and the number of votes in favor of Y in a subgroup of 7 participants randomly selected by the computer for her.
At the end of the experiment, in case phase 2 will be randomly selected for payment, the earnings of this part will be determined as follows.
If the number of votes in favor of the alternative you support is greater than or equal to the majority threshold you have chosen, then you get 22.00 euros. If the number of votes in favor of the alternative you do not support is greater than or equal to the majority threshold you have chosen, then you get 0.00 euros. If neither of the two alternatives receives a number of votes at least equal to the majority threshold you have chosen, then you get 11.00 euros.
Part 2 of phase 2
Your task in part 2 of phase 2.
[NO- INFO treatment] In this part of phase 2, you have to guess the number of votes for alternative X and the number of votes for alternative Y, with the sum of these numbers being equal to 31, namely to the total number of participants in the session.
[INFO treatment]
In this part of phase 2, you have to guess the number of votes for alternative X and the number of votes for alternative Y, with the sum of these numbers being equal to 35, namely to the total number of participants in the session.
If your guesses match the number of votes randomly assigned to alternative X and Y respectively, then 3.00 euros will be added to your earnings from part 1 of phase 2.
